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A Comparative Approach to
Teaching Criminal Procedure
and its Application to the
Post-Investigative Stage
Stephen C. Thaman

Why Bring a Comparative Perspective Into a Basic Bar Course Like
Criminal Procedure?

The criminal procedures of all countries, have, in a sense, been the result
of the mixing of different legal traditions and thus been products of com para·
tive law par excellence. Systems of criminal procedure have also tended to follow
similar progressions in their development, or to vacillate between discemable
models, depending on social, political, and economic conditions.
Hunters and gatherers and early agricultural societies tended to be
egalitarian and communitarian and their criminal procedures compensatory, conciliatory, and non-punitive. Decision making was in the hands of
trusted arbitrators, village elders, or the collective.' Restoring the peace was
paramount: punitive revenge was limited to the red-handed or hand-having capture, a kind of "unwritten law" justifying even homicide." Decen tralized egalitarian agrarian and feudal societies would tend to communitarian
justice, to the use of groups of citizens to smooth out internal conflicts: to
juries, or to Schiiffen (forums in which lay persons sit together with professional
judges).3 The same held tnte for early city-state democracies, in Athens and
Stephen C. Thaman is professor of law at Saint Louis University.
1.

H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law 6o-64 (2d
ed., Oxford, 2004), calls such legal systems "chthonic," rather than "folk," "primitive," or
"customary," generally connoting their "ecological" base.

2.

Uwe Wesel, Fruhformcn des Rcchts in vorstaatlichen Gesellschaften 133·36 (Suhrkamp,
Frankfurt am Maim, 1985) (discussing Greenland Eskimos). Thus under the Nuer in Somalia, adultery normally resulted in compensation of six head of cattle, but could result in
death if the culprit were caught in the act. P.P. Howell, A Manual of N uer Law 156 (Oxford,
1954); for a similar custom under the Ifugao in the Philippine highlands, see Roy Franklin Barton, lfugao Law, 15 Univ. of Cal. Publ'n American Archaeology & Ethnology 8, 73
(Berkeley, Cal., 1919).

3-

John P. Dawson, A History of Lay Judges 5 (Cambridge, Mass., r96o); Adhemar Esmein, A
History of Continental Criminal Procedure with Special Reference to France 3'l·34 (Boston,
191.3).
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Republican Rome. 4 The gradual centralization of the territories that would
make up the modern nation-states led to hierarchical systems of justice subordinate to the centralized power, whether monarchic or theocratic. Judging was
done by officials of the central power. Lay clements were either suppressed or
co-opted and subjugated to centralized authority.s
Adjudication was done in public, through witness testimony, the swearing
of oath-helpers, or through use of irrational ordeals, and the judgment was
pronounced orally by the jurors, Schijffin, or trusted elders. Few people were
literate and there was by and large no effective method of recording witness
testimony. Decisions were final and not subject to review. 6 With the advent
of printing, the development of cities, the systematic cultivation of learning
(in Europe in the Renaissance, perhaps earlier in Egypt, China, and perhaps
other parts of Asia),? and the centralization of political power under kings
and self-appointed rulers, criminal procedure became a means to control the
population: the economic surplus could support a class of magistrates, professors, and judges who could pursue legal careers full-time. 8 The procedure went
indoors, was clothed in secrecy, and was carried out without lay participation
"partly in the darkness of the torture chamber and partly on the green file
table before learned men in wigs" who judged "based on the dead writings of
torture and witness transcripts."9
The earliest forms of criminal procedure in all societies were likely
accusatorial, brought by the victim or his/her family or clan, for there
were no public officials who could act as accusers. Some procedures
were adoersarial, pitting accuser against accused, in contests of swearing
(use of compurgators) or of strength (duels, battle). Some forms were
inherently inquisitorial, subjecting the accused (or the accuser at times) to
a procedure designed to determine the truth: inquiry by a self-informing
jury or inquest, ordeals of hot iron or cold water where god allegedly decided guilt or innocence, or secular or divine inquisitions using torture
to complement other circumstantial or witness evidence.
Migrations, conquests, intermarriage, and travelled to the adopting of new
and adapting of old traditions. Sometimes conquering nations imposed their

4·

Dawson, A History of Lay Judges, supra note 3, at u-18.

5·

Mirjan R. Damaska, The races of Justice and State Authority 31!-33 (New Haven, Conn.,
1986).

6.

Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal Procedure, supra note g, at 4·7. See generally Ian
Wood, Disputes in Late Fifth·and Sixth·Century Gaul, in The Settlement of Disputes in
Early Medieval Europe 7-22 (Wendy Davies and Paul fouracre eds., Cambridge, rg86).

7·

Gutenberg appears to have created the first printing press in Europe in 1448, Chwe Yoon
Eyee having founded a similar device in Korea in 1234·

8.

\Vesel, Fri.ihformen, supra note

9·

Gustav Radbruch, Zur Einfi.ihrung in die Carolina iu Die peinliche Gerichtsordnung Kaiser
Karls V. von 1532 (Carolina) 22 (6th eel., Reclam, Stuttgart, rgg6).

2,

at 34'35·
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legal systems, sometimes they co-opted the extant legal system or gave the
conquered peoples freedom to accept or reject the new forms. 10
American criminal procedure has also been comparative from early times.
The English common law was brought to American shores, but in early colonial days had to compete with ecclesiastical and fundamentalist Biblical legal
sources before it was accepted throughout the land." Immigrants from Continental Europe influenced the early codification of American law, and the Bill
of Rights owed as much to the thinking underpinning the French Revolution
as it did to the earlier English constitutional sources." The fact that each state
has its own constitution, codes, and jurisprudence that have influenced the
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court as much as its jurisprudence has
modified state practices, means that to know American criminal procedure
means to be able to think comparatively.
The incorporation debate that preoccupied the U.S. Supreme Court from
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in r86s up through the late 196os
Warren Court decisions largely revolved around exercises in comparative law
by the justices. When state defendants tried to compel the Supreme Court
to incorporate important federal constitutional rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of due process and make them binding on the states,
the justices looked abroad, to Europe or the United Kingdom, and found
"civilized nations" that did not recognize institutions such as trial by jury,
double jeopardy protection against appeals of acquittals, or the privilege
against self-incrimination.'3
With the "criminal procedure revolution" unleashed by the vVarren Court's
nearly complete incorporation of the federal guarantees of the Bill of Rights
and its development of these rights in such landmark cases as Mapp v. Ohio and
Miranda v.Ark:ona, the U.S. Supreme Court's influence began to reach overseas
and to change the countries on the European Continent to whom the opponents of incorporation had appealed. Exclusionary rules and Miranda rights
are recognized, in one form or another, in most of the formerly inquisitorial

to.

When the Aryans brought Vedic law to Northern India, they allowed chthonic legal
traditions to persist until the new law was adopted through persuasion; on the contrary,
the invasions of the Muslims and the British led to massive replacement of Hindu law,
which remained only in the area of family law. Glenn, Legal Traditions, mpra note 1, at 272,
294. On the co-optation of chthonic English legal traditions by the Norman congucrors, see
id. at 224.

11.

Albert W. Alschuler and Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 UChi. L. Rev. 867, 871 (1994).

12.

Glenn, Legal Traditions, supra note

13.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). In Twining v. New Jersey, 2II U.S. 78, 112·13
(1908), the Court noted that the interrogation of the accused is the practice in the Civil Law

1,

at 248·51.

and that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent states from adhering to Civil rather
than Common Law practices.
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states of the European continent, as well as throughout Latin America and in
some parts of Asia.'4
Things changed, however, under the Burger and Rehnquist courts. The
Supreme Court increasingly created exceptions to the exclusionary rules under Mapp and Miranda and in its retrenchment increasingly sealed itself off
from looking overseas for comparative knowledge or inspiration. The "nativists" on the court would only look to US. legal tradition, as if it existed in a
hermetically scaled vacuum, and even more radically, only to the perceived
original meaning of the 1791 Framers of the Bill of Rights.'5 While scholars
have discerned a trend of "americanization" in reforms in Europe and elsewhere,'6 in the area of criminal procedure reform, the model is and has always
been the progressive measures taken by the Warren court and not the practices
of the later courts. As America entered the twenty-first century as the only
remaining superpower, it became arrogant on the international stage in its
refusal to work with its traditional allies and other countries on issues such
as the invasion of Iraq, the International Criminal Court, global warming,
and human rights. Domestically there has been a "sovietization" of American
law, with massive imprisonment of segments of the population (poor and minorities), draconian punishments, and an erosion of the jury trial through the
use of oppressive plea-bargaining.'? American prosecutors have become fully
as dominant in the American system as the prokuratura was in Soviet criminal
justice,' 8 and the judiciary has become just as compliant as the former Soviet
judges. Secret, uncontrolled, warrantless eavesdropping by the executive takes
a page from the methods of the Soviet Communist Party, where the collection
of information in secret regardless of its admissibility in court was deemed to
be more useful than merely following the Soviet law, as lenient as it might have
been.'9 Once one knows through illegal means that evidence may be found,
14.

See Stephen C. Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 St. Louis U. L.J 581 (2001). The
Korean Supreme Court recognized a version of Miranda warnings in its decision of March u,
1994,93 Do 958, cited from Kuk Cho, The Unfinished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of
Post-Democratization South Korea, 30 Denv, J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 377· 384 (2002).

15.

See Justice Scalia's opinion upholding the death penalty for minors in Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361,368-75 (1989), referring to the state of the law when the Bill of Rights were en·
acted and then solely to whether a consensus among the American states exists as to whether
juvenile death penalties should be abolished.

16.

See Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization
of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 Ha1v. Int'l
L. J 1 (2004), who sees the spread of plea bargaining in Europe and Latin America as
manifestations thereof.

'7·

See Stephen C. Thaman, Is America a Systematic Violator of Human Rights in the
Administration ofCrimina!Justice?, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 999, IOII·I? (;:woo).

rS.

On the dominant role of the Soviet and Russian procuracy, see Stephen C. Thaman, The
Refonn of the Procuracy and Bar in Russia, 3 Parker Sch. J. E. Eur. L.1, l7 (1996).

19.

Eric Lichtblau and Scott Shane, Basis for Spying in U.S. Is Doubted, N. Y. Times, Jan.
7, <:~oo6, at Ar. On October <:15, 2001, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft declared that
the main priority of his office was preventing terror acts, rather than prosecuting them.
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one can always manufacture "probable cause" to cleanse the evidence for use
in court.• 0
This trend seems to be weakening, as the Supreme Court, under the
guidance of Justice Anthony Kennedy and others, has begun to refer to international human rights law and foreign law to determine how to interpret
our Bill of Rights. •• The latest example of this jurisprudence was Roper v.
Simmons, where the Court struck down the death penalty for juveniles, after
noting that we were virtually the only country, and definitely the only democracy, that still pennitted this scandalous practice.•• Because American
criminal law has gradually become one of the most repressive and unjust
systems in the world with its over-determined penalty structures (continual use of the death penalty, life imprisonments for non-violent recidivist
thieves and drug dealers•J) and accompanying corruption of its truth-finding capacities resulting in conviction of countless innocent persons," 4 it is
time for our courts and our students to be aware of how other countries
process their criminal cases, to determine whether we can learn from them.
My experience has been that through comparative analysis one can better
detect the flaws as well as the strong points of our system, and can thus direct reform efforts in positive directions, informed by the wealth of options
comparative law provides.

Archetypes of Criminal Procedure as Teaching Tools
A panoply of diverse criminal procedures has historically been available in
most systems to deal with different types of crimes or evidentiary situations.
In my casebook on comparative criminal procedure•s I used three as leitmotifs
for the text: the flagrant crime, the ""who-done-it?" circumstantial evidence
John W. Whitebread and Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland
Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department's
Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 Am. U. L. Rev. 1081, 1083 (2002).
20.

Similar "hands·olf' procedures have been documented in Los Angeles since the 198os, thus
obviating the need to inform suspects after they have been wiretapped. See Whitaker v.
Garcetti, 291 F.Supp. 2d 1132 (C. D. Cal. 2003).

21.

JeffreyToobin, Swing Shift, New Yorker, Sept. 12,2005, available at <http://www.newyorker.
com/fact/content/articles/o5o9r2fa_fact> (last visited Dec. 12, 2006).

22.

543 u.s. 551, 575-78 (2005).

23.

Harmel in v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewingv.
California, 538 U.S. l l (2003).

24.

As of December 2005, at least r64 innocent persons had been cleared by DNA testing, Shaila
Dewan, After 24 Years in Prison, Man Has a Reason to Smile, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 2005, at
A26. At least 125 persons convicted since 1973 for capital murder have been released from
death rows across the country due to their factual innocence. Amnesty International U.S.A,
Abolish the Death Penalty, available at <http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/factsheets/
factsinnocence.html> (last visited Dec. 12, 2006).

25.

Stephen C. Thaman, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Casebook Approach (Durham,
N.C., 2oo2).
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case, and the secret victimless crime. Our experiences in the United States
since September n, 2001, have led me to envision a fourth category: special
procedures for the "other," the outsider, the enemy of the people, the "enemy
combatant."
The flagrant crime, where the culprit was caught in the act red-handed or
"hand-having" (with loot in hand), was often punished immediately with death
through self-help of victim or witness, or after perfunctory procedures giving
no protection to the accused. The flagrant offender could, in early inquisitorial
procedure, be tortured if he did not admit guilt, such was the presumption of
guilt? 6 Because of the strong presumption of guilt, flagrant crimes give rise
today in nearly all jurisdictions to special procedures, such as arrest without a
warrant, search of one's person, possessions, or premises incident to arrest, or
expedited trial with a leapfrogging of the preliminary investigation.•7 In the
United Kingdom, if one is arrested in flagrante and questioned by police, one's
silence may be used as evidence of guilt at trial. In France, if one is arrested in
possession of contraband entering the country, the burden of proof switches to
the suspect to prove a guilt-excluding fact, such as lack of knowledge.' 8
Where a crime has been committed, but there are no eyewitnesses or no
arrest at the time of or immediately afterward many procedures developed
in customary legal systems for determining guilt: ordeals of hot iron or cold
water, duels, or trials by battle, the summoning of witnesses of the suspect's
honesty (oath-helpers or compurgators), or conciliation and restitution procedures (wergeld and composition) were used to reach a conclusion of guilt and
restore the peace of the community. •9 Such crimes seldom ended in death penalties, likely out of communitarian reasons: the death of a member of the tribe
or village or clan meant the loss of a productive member of society. While
there may not have been a presumption of innocence, there was a drive to give
a suspect means to reintegrate himself in the community.Jo
These primitive procedures were replaced by jm)' trial in England and
the inquisitorial official investigation on the European Continent, both of
which claimed to be more humane and capable of determining the truth.
The formal rules of evidence in inquisitorial Europe, derived from Catholic
26.

!d. at 4·5. Contrast Thomas Weigend, Ddiktsopfer unci Strafverfahren 36·4!! (Berlin, 1g8g).

27.

Thaman, Comparative Criminal Procedure, mpm note 25, at 5, 39-40, H··t8.

28.

!d. at 170·7r.

29.

/d. at 6-8. In more detail, see generally Robert Bartlett, Trial By Fire and Water: The
Medieval Judicial Ordeal (New York, 1986); Wood, Disputes, sujnr< note 6, at 7''1.'2.

30.

Montesquieu noted: "Our fathers, the Gennans, did not allow but pecuniary punishments.
Those fighting and free men deemed their blood should not be allowed to How except
with arms in hand." Charles de Seconclat Montesquieu, I De L'esprit Des Lois 220 (GFFiammarion ed., Paris, r979); id. at VoL 2, 337·38. Among the Cheyenne, the predominant
punishment was exile buHvas often rescinded and the culprit reintegrated into the tribe.
Karl K. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law
in Primitive Jurisprudence r32-37 (Buffalo, NY., 2002). A similar mildness could be found
among theN uer. Howell, A Manual of Nuer Law, supra note 2, at 39·41.
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Canon law, made it very difficult to prove guilt in the absence of flagrancy
and, as in Islamic and Talmudic law, made conviction impossible without
a number of eyewitnesses.Jl The European way out was to authorize torture
if there was one eyewitness or other sufficient circumstantial evidence of
guilt, short of that required for conviction.>" As with ordeals, the person who
survived torture would not be convicted. Like ordeals, torture punished the
suspect based on probable cause, amounting to a kind of Verdachtsstrqft (punishment based on suspicion) which gathered in many innocents along with
the possibly guilty.:l3 Pretrial detention, typically in squalid, disease-ridden
jails, was also eminently life-threatening and was vociferously condemned
during the Enlightenment as being punishment without trial, or a type of
torture which was aimed at compelling a confession as effectively as was
torture.34 Finally, one could even claim that the methods of trial themselves
were a kind of punishment, even if the defendant were acquitted.35

If the crime was not flagrant, evidence had to be gathered in a preliminary
investigation, and one could perhaps speak of a presumption of innocence to
31.

At least two witnesses needed for Islamic Hadd crimes in absence of confession. See Islamic
Law: Myths and Realities, available at <http://muslim-canada.org!Islam_myths.htm> (last
visited Jan. 4, 2007). Maimonides, in reaffirming the requirement of "witnesses who testify
that they have clear and indubitable knowledge of the occurrenceH of a crime, notes "the
worst that can happen is that a transgressor will go free; but if we punish on the strength of
probabilities and suppositions, it may be that one day we shall put an innocent person to
death, and it is better and more desirable that a thousand guilty persons go free than that
a single innocent person be put to death." Nagar v. State oflsrael, 35(i) P.O. u3 (Ct. App.
1980), in Menachem Elan eta!., Jewish Law (Mishpat Ivri): Cases and Materials 201 (New
York, 1999).

3~·

John H. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe and England in the Ancien
Regime 4·5 (Chicago, 1977).

33-

Tn relation to coerced confessions, Beccaria wrote: "This infamous crucible of truth is a
still extant monument of the ancient and savage legislation, when the ordeals of fire and
boiling water were called 'judges of God."' Cesare Beccaria, Dei Delitti e Delle Pene 62
(Giangiacomo Feltrinelli ed., New York, 1995). He also bemoaned the number of innocents
sacrificed to this practice. !d.

34·

John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial49 (New York, 2003). See also
Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritto e Ragione: Teoria del Garantismo Penale 562-66 (5th ed., Rome,
1998).

35·

While I am unaware in the \Vest of any tradition of actual punishment inAicted during
public trial, such as whipping a defendant who refused to admit guilt as used to occur in
Tibet, Rebecca Redwood French, The Golden Yoke: The Legal Cosmology of Buddhist
Tibet 317 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1995), this notion underlies our approach to double jeopardy, which
is aimed at preventing the "embarrassment, expense and ordeal" of a second trial. Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. r84, 187 (1957). Compare with the Netherlands, where prosecutors
have been known to prosecute in absence of sufficient evidence in cases of complicated
white-collar fraud so at least the defendant will have his "comeuppance in the media."
Chrisje Brants and K.L.K. Brants, De Sociale Constructie van Fraude (Utrecht, 1991), cited
in Chrisje Brants, Consensual Criminal Procedures: Confession Bargaining and Abbrevi·
ated Procedures to Simplify Criminal Procedure (National Report: The Netherlands) for
International Congress of Comparative Law (Utrecht, Neth., 2006).
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counteract the all-too-common feeling that where there is smoke there must be
fire. European jurisdictions required reasons given by professional judges to
justify reaching conclusions of guilt based on circumstantial evidence.3 6 Summary procedures are not suitable where there is no flagrancy, or no confession.
Acquittals should be tolerated.
Victimless crimes are crimes against the state (or the church) par excellence.
No one is personally harmed by them, no one complains or brings private
prosecution. There can be no accusatorial or adversarial altercation to decide
guilt. The prototype for the development of the inquisitorial model of criminal
procedure is the investigation of sedition, blasphemy, and heresy. That method's motto is secrecy. Its goal is to penetrate the interior recesses of a suspect's
mind or his or her abode.37 The methods were torture, compelled testimony
under oath, or general warrants to search homes or other buildings in the good
old days.3 8 Today these methods are augmented by wiretaps, bugs, undercover
informants, Carniuore, and national security letters and are applied to the war
against drugs, the war against organized crime, the war against terrorism, and
the prosecution of other crimes that otherwise leave no traces other than in
one's own home: possession of drugs, pornography, weapons.39 Just as probable cause was needed in the famous 1532 German code, the Carolina, before a
torture warrant would issue, 40 it is now normally needed for search warrants,
wiretaps, and in European countries such as Germany, for using undercover
informants or doing long-term surveillance. 4 ' Theoretically, these techniques
were aimed at investigating either crimes already committed or ongoing criminal activity. There is always a danger-again, the threat of Sovietization-that
they will be used simply to preventively gather evidence on the citizenry in
general, to be used when the law enforcement apparatus deems it necessary.

36.

Thaman, Comparative Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 200-r3-

37·

According to Montesquieu, "one needs a secret _judiciary; because the crimes which they
punish, always profound, are formed in secrecy and in silence. This judiciary needs to have
a general inquisition; because it does not need to stop the evils which it recognizes, but to
prevent those which it does not know." Montesquieu, r De L'esprit des Lois, supra note 30, at
137'38.

38.

[n pursuing "secret actions" which "injure Divinity," Montesquieu asserted that "there is no
public act, there is no material for crime: all goes on inside the person, and God knows the
measure and time of his vengeance." He criticized the magistrate who "investigates the hidden sacrilege ... conducts an inquisition into a type of act where it is not even necessary" and
"destroys the liberty of citizens." !d. at 330.

39·

On this computer search technology, see Trenton C. Haas, Carnivore and the Fourth
Amendment, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 261 (2oor); 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (codified at§ 505 of the USA
Patriot Act); Thaman, Comparative Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at r3-r4.

40.

Thaman, Comparative Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 8-9-

4I.

!d. at 72 n.r2. Since invasions of privacy are illegal and usually criminal without probable
cause, can we also not characterize these measures as punishment upon probable cause,
whether or not guilt is ever ascertained?
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Finally, consider special treatment for the "other." Small closely knit
societies were notoriously lenient with their own when they violated
local rules or customs, or committed crimes. Unless a person was caught
in flagrante and immediately killed, the procedures were often conciliatory,
aimed at reestablishing the judicial peace and reintegrating the offender with
his or her community. The procedural outlets were limited and death penalties were more common if an outsider, a highwayman, was caught robbing,
stealing, or murderingY Society itself was not losing an able-bodied man or
woman, though conciliation could be required to fend off a feud or a war with
another tribe, clan, or community.·13 The notion of special rules for the "other"
can also be seen in societies split by class or racial differences. England had a
two-tier system of justice for the counseled well-to-do and for the counsel-less
"wretches" who so often ended on the gallows. 44 The United States clearly
had, and many would say still has, a two-tier system for the wealthy and the
poor, the white and the black. •s
But the positing of a social enemy-organized crime in the rg8os and rggos
and now terrorists and Islamists in the new century-has always been a clarion
cry to toughen criminal sanctions, to chip away at the protections for the crimi·
nally accused, and even to introduce parallel procedural systems without the
guarantees given to the homegrown folks. This is most apparent today with
the unlimited detention without any due process of"enemy combatants," and
their trial without the ability to subpoena witnesses or provide an effective
defense.
Application of Comparative Models in the Post-Investigative Stage of
Criminal Procedure: "Bail To Jail"
Some areas of post-investigative procedure in which comparative material
can help to broaden the discussion in fruitful ways are: (r) the role of the aggrieved party (victim) in the charging and prosecution of criminal cases; (2) the
clash between the rules of mandatory and discretionary prosecution (legality
and opportunity principles), and the procedural effect of guilty-pleas or con·
fessions in the move to consensual, abbreviated, and expedited procedures;
(3) the passive or active (inquisitorial) role of the trial judge and its relation to
the presumption of innocence; (4) the use of written materials at trial pre-pack·
aged by one of the parties and its clash with the right of confrontation; and
42.

Barton, Ifugao Law, supra note 2, at 66, discussing the Ifugao highlanders of the Philippines.
The Nuer did not consider it a wrong to kill a foreigner. Howell, A Manual of Nuer Law,
supra note 2, at 207.

43·

ld. at :q.

44-

Langbein, Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, supra note 34, at 315"17; as Alexander Pope
wrote, "The hungry Judges soon the Sentence sign, and Wretches hang that jurymen may
Dine.» ld. at 25.

45·

On the racist kangaroo courts for Black defendants in the South, see Alschuler and Deiss, A
BriefHistoryofCriminaljury, supra note 11, at 880·90.
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finally (5) the division of labor at trial in relation to the determination of the
facts, guilt, and sentence between lay and professional judges.

The Role rf the Victim in Charging and Prosecuting Criminal Cases
Ironically, many of the continental European justice systems remained
much more accusatorial and adversarial than their Common Law counterparts
in one area: the a1lowance of private prosecution by the victim or aggrieved
party of minor offenses, such as battery, libel, and insults, but also, in Spain,
of all cases including major felonies. 46 Despite all the high-profile trumpet·
ing of victim's rights by prosecutorial organizations and their supporters in
the United States, American prosecutors steadfastly refuse to give up their
monopoly on prosecution. The victim's movement has been cleverly used as
a mechanism to strip away the rights of the defense, pass more severe penalties, and allow victim impact evidence, after guilt has already been decided to
inflame the passions of the jury.
The strong role of the victim in Spain, who files her own accusatory
pleading, has a right to court-appointed counsel if indigent, may present
evidence at every stage of the case, and may argue the case, will lead vic·
tims' advocates to ask why such a system does not exist in the United
States. 47 0 ne can discuss why the grand jury, a popular body before being
completely co-opted by the prosecution, could not be transformed to allow
charging upon motion of a victim in cases where the prosecutor refuses
to do so. The role of the victim as civil party seeking damages as well as
conviction can be discussed in relation to a case like that ofO.J. Simpson.
Would it have been preferable to combine civil and criminal actions in that
case? Finally, many may conclude that the empowerment of the victim,
and in Spain any member of the public as well as a popular prosecutor,
could too clutter the criminal trial, violate the equality of arms by lining up
two, three, or more prosecutors against a single defendant, and constitute
a return to revenge as a motive for criminal prosecution. 48
Plea-Bargaining;, Procedural Diversity, and the Legality Principle
In teaching American plea-bargaining, I like to emphasize that aU criminal
procedure systems have an official "procedure with all its guarantees" that cornports with due process, and principles of orality, immediacy, confrontation,
presumption of innocence, and a right to remain silent, which is trumpeted as
the crown jewel of the justice system. In the United States, the crown jewel is
the jury trial, and on the European Continent it is the full-blown preliminary
46.

Thaman, Comparative Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 21-Q5.

47·

Julio Perez Gil, Private Interests Seeking Punishment: Prosecution Brought by Private
Individuals and Groups in Spain, 25 Law & Pol'y '5' (2003).

48.

For a criticism of the role of the victim as private prosecutor in the lirsl year of Spanish jury
trial, see Stephen C. Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by Jury, 21 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L
Rev. 241, 39]"401 (1998).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=259

A CornparatiueApjJroach to Teaching Criminal Procedure

investigation by an impartial magistrate or prosecutor and a subsequent oral
trial.+9 The reality of criminal procedure has always been more complex. There
has always been procedural diversity, many ways to resolve a dispute labeled
"criminal." In medieval times there were ordeals, duels, trial by oath-helpers,
victim-offender compoundment, and jury trials, and then the inquisitorial
investigation.5°
In modern times, the participants in criminal procedure-prosecutors,
judges, defense counsel, the defendant-have always sought ways to avoid the
full-blown trial and come to swifter and more certain results. In jury systems,
where outcomes were considerably less predictable than in trial courts composed of professional judges or mixed courts, a guilty plea with a reduced
sentence or reduced charges eliminated the uncertainty of outcome and saved
the state the considerable costs of a trial. In more judge-dominated systems,
a "deal" would be crowned with a mitigated sentence or often a release from
pretrial custody, based on procedural economy, saving time and resources,
even though the outcomes of trials in such systems are certainly more predict·
able.s• The bargaining for guilty pleas was secret in the United States until the
mid-twentieth century and the bargaining for trial-shortening confessions was
secret in Germany until revealed in rg82 by a la\vycr under the pseudonym
"Detlev Deal."5•
Since then there has been a "triumphal march of consensual procedures"
laying waste to the keystone principles of con tin ental nco-inquisitorial procedure: the principle of legality, that all crimes must be pursued, prosecuted,
and punished; and the requirement of a judicial decision based on reasons to
provide certainty in the results of criminal procedure. It is interesting for students to compare European practices with the wide-open American practice
of plea-bargaining in cases ranging from misdemeanors to capital cases and
in which prosecutors, thanks to the colossal raising of minimum and maximum terms of deprivation of liberty in the rg8os and 1990s, are in complete
control, making any perceived "give and take" trumpeted by the supporters
of plea-bargaining as a "contract" illusory. In no way can one say that a petty
recidivist thief who is offered a five year sentence for his guilty plea, with life
imprisonment the alternative if he is convicted by a jury,53 makes a "voluntary

49·

Stephen C. Thaman, Gerechtigkeit und Verfahrensvielfalt: Logik der beschleunigten,
konsuellen und vereinfachten Strafprozessmodelle, i11 Recht·Gesellschaft·Kommunikation.
Festschrift fiir Klaus F. Rohl3o6, 3r6·r7 (Stefan Machura and Stefan Ulbrich eds., Baden·
Baden, 2003).
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ld. at 306.

51.

Mi~jan R. Damaska, Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts, 2]. Int'l Crim.
Just. wr8, 1019, 1022·23 (2004).

52.

Thaman, Gerechtigkeit, supra note 49, at 310.
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Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). There the petty thief insisted on a trial and got
life imprisonment and the Court found no violation of due process.
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and knowing choice" when he decides to plead guilty, whether he is guilty or
innocentY
Nearly all Western European countries that have laws introducing plea·
bargaining-like mechanisms insist on con trolled discounts, typically one-third
to one-half, for a renunciation of the right to a full triaLs." Even Germany's
informal "confession" bargaining or Absprachen requires that the difference between maximum and offered punishment is not so extreme as to make the
"deal" coercive.55 Exceptions can be found in some former socialist republics,
which have embraced more wide open American-influenced models of plea
bargaining.Si
I like to ask students whether confessions in general should be bargained
for in the United States with mandatory participation of defense counsel, as
is done with the in-court confessions we call guilty pleas. Why should a suspect be able to confess to capital murder in the jailhouse and be sentenced
to death witho'ut counsel, and yet be guaranteed the right to counsel during
plea bargaining negotiations, after the die has already been cast and the defendant is outgunned by the prosecutor at every step?5 8 Should the cost of
54·

Damaska, Negotiated justice, supra note 51, at 1028.

55·

Discounts of no more than one·third are guaranteed in the Italian pallcggiamento procedure
(for crimes puni~hable by no more than five years), §§ 444.445 C.P.P. (as amended Mar.
27, \lOOI), in Codice e lcggi per l'udienza penale ;pyt6 (Mario Chiavario et al., eds., Turin,
2004), the Russian procedure (crimes punishable by no more than ten years), § 314 UPK,
Rossiiskoi Federatsii (as amended July 4, !2003), in Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks, Ros·
siiskoi Federatsii 150 (Moscow, 2005), and a new procedure for Hagrant cases in Spain, in
which a stipulation to the correctness of the charges or conjimnidad is entered to crimes pun·
ishable by no more than three years, where the one·third discounted punishment may also
be suspended (§ 801 L.E. Crim. (as amended Oct. 24, 2002), in Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal y Legislaci6n Complementaria 293·94 (17th ed., Madrid, 2002). The new French
guilty plea procedure grants a discount of from one· half to one· third on fines and allows for
punishments of no more than six months imprisonment for crime& punishable by up to five
years. § 49y8 C.P. (as amended Mar. 9, \l004), Law no. 2004·204 (Mar. 9· 2004), Journal
Official, Mar. 10, 2004 (in effect, Oct. 1, 2004).

56.

The authoritative decision of the German Supreme Court of August 28, 1997, requires that
the discount be proportionate to guilt so as not to coerce a confession. Thaman, Comparative
Criminal Law, supm note 25, at 149·

57·

Agreements between prosecution and defense in the ~wo5 Bulgarian Code of Criminal
Procedure may apply to nearly all crimes and allow the judge to even sen tcnce below the
statutory minimum sentence. § 381 Nakazatelno protsesualen kodeks (Apr. 29, 2006),
available at d1ttp://lex.bgllaws/ldoc.php?fDNA;2J355''2224> (last visited Nov. 29, 2006);
Georgia, §§ 679·1·7 CCP·Georgia, signed by the President on Feb. 13, 2004 (on file with
author), and Moldova,§§ 504·509 Ugolovno·protsessual'nyy kodeks Respubliki Moldova
338·44 (2003), have recently added plea-agreement provisions seemingly modeled on Amer·
ican cooperation agreements. New Estonian plea bargain procedures apply to all crimes
except those punishable by a minimum oF four years and a maximum of life imprisonment
and involve no statutory discounts,§§ 239·50 Estonian Code of Criminal Procedure (Feb.
12, 2003), available at dutp://v..'Ww.legaltext.ce/text/en/x6oo27k3.htm> (last visited Dec.
12, 2006).
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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=259

A Comparative Approach to Teaching Criminal Procedure

47I

using a suspect's confession be mandatory mitigation, inexorably removing
the maximum punishment from the table?59

Presumption rif Innocence and the lnquisitmial Judge
The last three discussion areas I highlight deal mainly with the full-blown
trial, whether in a Common Law adversarial system or a Civil Law, more judgedirected system. Of course their importance is rapidly diminishing with the
expansion of alternative forms of trial. It is useful to ask students whether they
believe that an active judge will improve the quality of American jury trials, by
coming to the aid of defendants represented by incompetent or overwhelmed
court-appointed lawyers, or to the aid of the rookie prosecutor who is being
outmaneuvered by veteran defense counseL Should the trial judge attempt to
make the trial a better vehicle for the determination of truth by summoning
supplementary witnesses or by engaging in more profound questioning? 60
Many students think this a good idea. They may be asked whether it would
be a good idea to allow the trial judge to read the entirety of the prosecution's
file (and perhaps the defense file as well) so that his or her truth-finding activity will be better directed. Of course, this is the model in many European
systems, notably, in Germany, in the Netherlands, and in French and Russian
trials without lay participation. But if one posits that the judge is also a trier of
the facts, as is the case in those countries (except in Russian jury trials), then is
it plausible to believe that he or she can actually presume the defendant to be
innocent, after having read the prosecutor's file and determined (in Germany
and Russia) that there is sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict? Can a
trial participant who sees himself or herself as an investigator of the truth be
truly impartial, once he or she has developed a hypothesis of guilt? 6' Should
an investigating magistrate also act as trial judge? Of course nearly all persua·
sive authority rejects such a notion. 6 ' Should the judge, in a jury trial or mixed
court, be able to interrupt a trial which he/she thinks is headed for acquittal,
and send the case back to the official investigator to look for further evidence
of guilt? This practice, which exists in Russia, France, and the Netherlands, 63
59·

.Most European penal codes recognize confession as a mitigating factor, but not necessarily
as obligatorily mitigating.

6o.

Federal R. Evid. 6<.t(b) permits the judge to "interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself
or by a party."

61.

See the discussion on the role of judge in various European countries, with pertinent
cases, Thaman, Comparative Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 173·81.

62.

On the decisive case law of the European Court of Human Rights in this area, see Stefan
Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings 69-74 (Oxford,
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Although§ 237 of the 2001 Russian Criminal Procedure Code sought to eliminate returning
a case for further investigation, the Russian Constitutional Court resurrected this practice
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will seem alien to our students, especially when they are studying our notions
of double jeopardy.
All in all, students will likely prefer our jury system with a passive judge
and with strict notions of double jeopardy, to the inquisitorial trial judge in
Germany and France. The trend in modern criminal procedure reform is also
away from the inquisitorial judge as can be discerned by reforms in Italy, to
a halting extent in Russia and the former Soviet Republics, and in much of
Latin America. "4

The Right to an Oral, Immediate Trial and the Right to
Confront Witnesses
Although the right to confrontation is usually not taught in criminal
procedure classes in the United States, it is a crucial element in the dis·
cussion of criminal procedure reform around the world. Prior to the deci·
sion in Crawford v. Washington in 2004, 65 it appeared that the approach to
the admissibility of hearsay and other statements and documents in the
investigative or prosecutorial files in the civil and common law worlds was
merging. European countries, pushed by decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights, were beginning to limit the use of hearsay and witness
statements, especially if those statements are the main evidence of guilt, 66
whereas decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and British law were creat·
ing residual exceptions to the hearsay rule and letting in much "reliable"
hearsay. ti7
One can ask students whether it is fair that one party in the criminal trial,
the prosecution, should be able to unilaterally prepare evidence in written form
that reflects statements, opinions, or actions by others, and never call the wit·
nesses whose statements, opinions, or actions are depicted therein. Does this
seem like fair adversarial procedure or "equality of arms," as the jurisprudence
under the European Convention on Human Rights puts it? Of course, this
was the approach of inquisitorial countries on the European Continent and
elsewhere, where trust in public officialdom (police, investigating magistrates,
prosecutors, trial judges) was sufficient to outweigh the violations of the right
to confrontation of witnesses and of the right of the trier offact to see and hear
the witnesses in open court.
grazhdan, Dec. 8, 2003, available at <http://ks.rfnet.ru/pos/pr8_o3.hlm> (last visited Nov.
29, ~wo6). See also Stewart Field et al., Prosecutors, Examining Judges, and Control of
Police Investigations, in Criminal Justice in Europe, a Comparative Study 229·42 (Phil
Fennell et al., eds., 1995).
G4.

Mirjan R. Damaska, Models of Criminal Procedure, 51 Zbornik PFZ 477, 48o-8r (2001)
(Collected Papers of Zagreb Law School).

65.

541

66.

Thaman, Comparative Criminal Procedure, mpra note 25, at II9·126.
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Id. at 126-29, in relation to England and Wales; cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 6s-66
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The trend is to limit the admissibility of prior statements of witnesses and
much hearsay in criminal procedure reform today, making formerly inquisitorial systems that relied on reading of documents more like the common law
system. The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988 was the pioneer in
this reform effort and has been copied or emulated in reforms in Spain (the
Jury Law of I995) and Latin America. 68 It is interesting to listen to students'
opinions when asked if they think judges or juries could assess the probative
value of hearsay using what Europeans call the "free evaluation of evidence"
and reject it when unconvincing or accept it when reliable, thus obviating the
need for a hearsay rule. This "let it all in" approach is advocated occasionally
by American scholars in relation to hearsay, 69 but especially in the area of illegally gathered evidence, where the truth, supposedly, should "out."7o Will
there be more truth or less truth with the use of written documents?
An interesting resolution of this problem occurs in the growing use of
pretrial depositions conducted by an impartial judge with participation of
prosecution and defense in cases where there is fear that a witness may not
be available or will change his or her testimony before trial. A more radical suggestion is to make the entire preliminary investigation a la Europeene
adversarial to the extent possible, thus guaranteeing the right to confrontation during the gathering of all evidence subsequent to the defendant's arrest
or charging and the subsequent admissibility of the evidence in emergency
situations.7' Such a wide-open pretrial stage would also facilitate consensual
resolution of cases through plea bargaining or prosecutorial penal orders.

Division of Labor between Lay and Professional judge in Deciding Facts,
Guilt, and Sentence
I like to discuss jury trial as an eminently political choice for countries, yet
one that will not necessarily lead to better results in criminal trials. Though
not of democratic origin, the jury trial became a symbol of the bourgeois revolutions in Europe and America that were inspired by democratic values. It provides effective popular participation in the judicial branch of government, just
as elections provide it in the legislative and executive branches.7' I also argue
68.

0 n Italy and Spain, sec Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 4-8, at 281·82, 297-301; on
Venezuela, sec Stephen C. Thaman, Latin America's First Modern System of Lay Par·
ticipation iTl Strafrecht, Strafprozessrecht und Menschenrechte. Festschrift fi.ir Stefan
Trechsel 770·71 (Andreas Donatsch eta!., eds. 2002).

69.

Richard 0. Lempert, Narrative Relevance, Imagined Juries, and a Supreme Court Inspired
Agenda for Jmy Research, 21St. Louis U. Public L. J. 15, 18·19 (2002).

70.

Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757 (1994);
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 363.

71.

Thaman, Comparative Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 33"39· Thaman, Gerechtigkeit,
supra note 49, at 316.

72.
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that only the classic jmy, which deliberates separately from the professional
bench, provides an arena where one has a truly impartial factfinder unsullied
by material in the dossier and really able, with proper instructions, to entertain
a presumption of innocence.73
But I like to depict the history of jury trial in England and in its post-1789
manifestations on the European Continent, Latin America, and Asia as a con·
stant battle between the professional judiciary and the lay judges over con·
trol of the guilt decision and, ultimately, the sentencing decision. Jurors could
deny the judge the right to sentence by nullifying the law and acquitting even
if convinced of guilt, if they felt the sentences were too harsh or the laws un·
just. English judges tried to restrict juries in seditious libel cases to the naked
historical fact of whether the defendant published the contested writing or
gave the contentious speech. Defendants insisted that the jury had the inher·
ent power to decide the legal question, as to whether the text was libelous.
This was the heyday of the jury as a political institution. The protagonists of
the law-finding jury won out with Fox's Libel Act of r693.14 This history led the
French and later the majority of continental European countries to introduce
trial by jmy in the wake of the French Revolution.
But the European jury differed from the English jury in that jurors,
in addition to deciding guilt, also answered a list of questions, a form of
special verdict, which determined the elements of the crime and the aggravating and mitigating factors that could influence sentence. European
cassational courts tried to limit juries to deciding just these constitutive
questions and thus leave it to the professional judge to interpret the jury's
answers and determine what particular crime the defendant was guilty of.
European academics contended that guilt was a mixed question of fact
and law and that jurors should not answer legal questions. They claimed
that the mixed court, where lay and professional judges deliberated together on all issues of fact, law, and sentence was superior for this reason.
Liberal, democratic forces stemmed the tide toward eliminating the jury
systems until the totalitarian tsunami of the first half of the twentieth century wiped out democracies and constitutional monarchies, and the jmy,
in Russia, Italy, France, Japan, Spain, and Germany. Is
European jury verdicts were always majoritarian, never unanimous, and
jury selection was always very quick with little voir dire and relatively few
peremptory challenges. In discussing Batson v. Kentudy,7 6 it is interesting to
discuss with students whether we should abolish peremptory challenges,n
73·

ld. at 103·04.
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and go to a super-majoritarian verdict (like the 10-2 verdicts allowed in
England and Wales and Oregon), and leave, for instance, African-Americans or anti-death penalty jurors on jury panels, so as not to exclude their
points of view, bearing in mind that a majority could outvote them.
Only with the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones v. United States,i8
Apprendi v. New Jersey,79 Ring v. Ari;:ona, 8" Blakely v. U"ashington, 8' and United States v.
Booker, 8• did it become apparent that the European special verdict, with questions related to elements of crimes and aggravating and mitigating factors,
might be relevant to the U.S. discussion. 83 Obviously, the statut01y schemes
struck down in the Apprrndi-Booker line of cases permitted judges to co-opt the
bulk of the decision making from juries by labeling issues as varied as weight
of drugs, type of weapon, seriousness of injuries, presence of racist motives,
and the presence of aggravating facts in capital cases "sentencing" issues for
the judge to be decided by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than issues for the jury to be decided beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 < Although the
bifurcated opinion in Booker has temporarily resurrected the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines as being advisory only, thus avoiding the question, Blakely and Jones
clearly leave open the question as to whether these factual issues, most of them
related to the commission of the crime and not criminal history of the defendant, should always be left to the jury if they have an impact on the minimum
or maximum sentence ranges. 85
Conclusion
By immersing oneself in comparative law and the history of criminal
procedure, one gains innumerable insights that help in understanding the
advantages and the shortcomings of our domestic system of law, which is
the focus of most of our teaching. It is illusory for Americans to think that
our system of criminal procedure can be understood solely in terms of its
own internal laws and jurisprudence, hermetically sealed off from other
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For a discussion of the special verdicts in the new Russian and Spanish jury systems, see
Stephen C. Thaman, Europe's New Jury Systems, in World jury Systems 319, 338·44 (Neil
Vidmar eel., New York, 2000).

84.

The use of special verdicts in relation to capital aggravators was rejected by the Florida
Supreme Court after having been hrought up in the wake of Ring. Florida v. Steele, 9QI
So.2d 538, 544·48 (Fla. 2005). On the desirability of moving to general jury sentencing in
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systems oflaw that have sought to deal with similar problems over the ages.
The reception of principles we hold dear to us-adversary procedure, jury
trial, the right to confrontation, the presumption of innocence-in systems
with different philosophical and social underpinnings can only give us a
broader perspective on the application and appropriateness of these principles. Even further, study of our ancient customary past, and the remarkable
chthonic legal systems that functioned at the time of European colonization
and still exist in varying degrees, provide us alternative examples of how to
resolve the connicts we have labeled as criminal. We can find the principles
of community, reconciliation, restitution, and forgiveness expressly in our
own Native American legal heritage and these could provide some important models for humanizing the monster that American criminal justice has
become at the dawn of the twenty-first century.H 6

86.

See Llewellyn and Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way, supra note 30, at 3119·30.
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